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WELLFORD, Circuit Judge: 
 
                           I. OVERVIEW 
         The primary dispute in this appeal concerns the rate of 
postpetition interest to which 
plaintiffs, the Penn Hills School District and Allegheny County, 
Pennsylvania, are entitled in 
connection with their oversecured prepetition tax claims against the 
defendants, numerous Chapter 
Thirteen bankruptcy debtors.  Plaintiffs contend that interest should 
accrue at the applicable rates 
set forth in the Pennsylvania Municipal Code, and thus, that the 
bankruptcy and district courts 
erred in approving defendants' bankruptcy plans, which proposed to pay 
postpetition interest at 
a substantially lesser rate.  Having carefully considered this issue and 
the others presented in this 
appeal, we AFFIRM in part and REVERSE in part.  
 
                    II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
         Samuel and Alice DeSarno, Laura and David Rankin, Stacy Johnson, 
and Alice 
Bonacci defaulted on real estate taxes owed to Allegheny County and the 
Penn Hills School 
District.  Because the salient facts are identical as to each defendant, 
we limit our background 
discussion to the DeSarnos.  After the Desarnos defaulted on their tax 
obligations, plaintiffs filed 
secured claims against their principal residence in the approximate amount 
of $4,500.  Under 
Pennsylvania law, these claims constitute first liens on the property and 
plaintiffs are entitled to 
receive interest on the underlying debts at certain statutorily prescribed 
rates.  The DeSarnos' 
residence is worth many times the amount of the principal debt plus 
interest; thus, plaintiffs' 
claims are substantially oversecured. 
         In June 1993, to avoid a foreclosure on their house, the DeSarnos 
filed a voluntary 
petition for bankruptcy under Chapter Thirteen of the United States 
Bankruptcy Code.  The 
DeSarnos subsequently filed a plan proposing to pay in full plaintiffs' 
prepetition claims (100 
percent of the principal debt plus interest at the statutory rates), but 
proposing to pay postpetitioninterest at a rate much lower than those 
prescribed by the relevant Pennsylvania statutes.   
         In November 1993, the bankruptcy court confirmed the DeSarnos' 
plan subject to 
a determination of the appropriate postpetition interest rate.  The 
bankruptcy court directed the 
parties to file briefs supporting their respective positions, but did not 
schedule oral argument or 
conduct an evidentiary hearing on the matter.  Allegheny County and Penn 
Hills argued at the 
confirmation hearing that they were entitled to interest at twelve and ten 
percent per annum, 
respectively, pursuant to Pennsylvania statutes.  The DeSarnos, on the 
other hand, argued that 
plaintiffs' postpetition claims were modifiable under 11 U.S.C.  
1322(b)(2) and that postpetition 
interest should be set to accrue at a "reasonable" rate, as opposed to the 
statutory rates. 
         In May 1994, the bankruptcy court confirmed the DeSarnos' plan in 
its entirety, 
holding that plaintiffs' claims were modifiable and that the proposed rate 
of postpetition interest 
met and exceeded the rate that the court determined to be reasonable.  
Thereafter, plaintiffs sought 
review of the plan in the district court.  Notwithstanding initial concern 
over the bankruptcy 
court's failure to hold an evidentiary hearing to aid in its determination 
of an appropriate interest 
rate, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision.  This 
timely appeal ensued.  
Defendant Stacy Johnson subsequently filed a cross-appeal challenging the 
applicable rate of 
prepetition interest for Allegheny County.  
 
                      III. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
         The following issues are before us in this appeal and cross-
appeal:  (1) whether it 
was error to determine that Allegheny County is entitled under 
Pennsylvania statutory law to 
prepetition interest at a rate of twelve percent per annum; (2) whether 
the lower courts erred in 
holding that a tax claim secured by a statutory lien on a Chapter Thirteen 
debtor's principal 
residence is modifiable pursuant to 11 U.S.C.  1322(b)(2); and (3) if so, 
whether the reduced 
rate of postpetition interest approved by the lower courts provides 
plaintiffs with the "present 
value" of their claims pursuant to 11 U.S.C.  1325(a)(5)(B)(ii). 
 
                     IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW   
         We review the bankruptcy court's findings of fact for clear 
error.  Sharon Steel 
Corp. v. National Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 872 F.2d 36, 38 (3d Cir. 1989).  
We exercise plenary 
review, however, in regard to the bankruptcy court's "choice, application 
and interpretation of 
legal precepts."  Id. at 38-39.   
 
                          V. DISCUSSION 
                     A. Prepetition Interest 
         We first address whether the bankruptcy court correctly 
determined that Allegheny 
County is entitled to prepetition interest on its tax claims at a rate of 
twelve percent under 
Pennsylvania law.  Although most of the defendants have conceded this 
point, defendant Johnson 
argues that the county is entitled to a maximum interest rate of only ten 
percent.  We disagree. 
         Pursuant to 72 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.  5648, "second class" 
Pennsylvania 
counties are entitled to interest on all county tax delinquencies and may 
adopt a maximum interest 
rate of twelve percent per annum on these debts.  It is undisputed that 
Allegheny County is the 
only "second class" county for purposes of  5648 and that its County 
Commissioners have chosen 
to charge tax debtors the maximum amount allowed under that statute.  
Nevertheless, Johnson 
argues that  5648 conflicts with and is governed by 53 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann.  7143, which 
provides that interest claims made by municipalities for unpaid taxes 
cannot exceed ten percent 
per annum.   
         We agree that  7143 conflicts with  5648, but we do not find  
7143 to be 
controlling.  Notwithstanding Johnson's assertions to the contrary,  5648 
is the more specific of 
the two statutes because it deals with tax delinquencies in second class 
counties.  Further, the ten 
percent interest rate of  7143, established by an amendment dated October 
29, 1981, predatesthe twelve percent interest rate of  5648, which was 
established on May 5, 1982.  See Pa. Laws 
319, No. 113,  1; Pa. Laws 372, No. 106,  1.  Section 1933 of the 
Pennsylvania Statutory 
Construction Act of 1972 provides: 
 
              Whenever a general provision in a statute shall be in 
              conflict with a special provision in the same or 
              another statute, the two shall be construed, if 
              possible, so that effect may be given to both.  If the 
              conflict between the two provisions is irreconcilable, 
              the special provisions shall prevail and shall be 
              construed as an exception to the general provision, 
              unless the general provision shall be enacted later 
              and it shall be the manifest intention of the General 
              Assembly that such general provisions shall prevail. 
 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.  1933 (emphasis added).  Based on  1993, the 
special provision 
allowing twelve percent interest to second class counties embodied in  
5648 prevails over the 
general provision of  7143 and must be construed as an exception to it. 
         To summarize,  5648 is inconsistent with  7143 because it 
specifically empowers 
the Allegheny County commissioners to establish an interest rate of up to 
twelve percent on 
delinquent taxes.  Section 7143, on the other hand, provides for a maximum 
rate of only ten 
percent.  Thus, the two statutes are in conflict because they authorize 
different rates.  The 
commissioners, taking advantage of the full authorization of  5648, 
established the applicable rate 
at twelve percent.  We believe that  5648--the later, more specific 
statute--controls here.  
Accordingly, we hold that Allegheny County is entitled to prepetition 
interest at a rate of twelve 
percent per annum under  5648 and thus AFFIRM the ruling of the lower 
courts on that issue.  
 
                     B. Postpetition Interest 
         Turning to the next issue, we note that the parties agree that 
plaintiffs are entitled 
to some amount of postpetition interest on their claims, but they disagree 
as to the rate at which 
such interest should accrue.  In this regard, plaintiffs first argue that 
the lower courts erred in 
holding that their claims to postpetition interest at the statutory rates 
are modifiable under 11 
U.S.C.  1322(b)(2).  Alternatively, plaintiffs assert that the confirmed 
interest rates are 
insufficient to provide them with the present value of their allowed 
secured claims under 11 
U.S.C.  1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).  We address each of these contentions in turn. 
 
                   (1) 11 U.S.C.  1322(b)(2)       
         Section 1322(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that Chapter 
Thirteen plans 
may "modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim 
secured only by a security 
interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence."  11 
U.S.C.  1322(b)(2) 
(emphasis added).  Defendants concede that plaintiffs' claims are secured 
by liens on their 
principal residences.  Therefore, the key issue is whether those liens 
constitute "security interests" 
for purposes of the antimodification provision of  1322(b)(2).   
         The Bankruptcy Code defines "security interest" as "a lien 
created by an 
agreement."  11 U.S.C.  101(51) (emphasis added).  In contrast, the Code 
provides that the term 
"statutory lien" means a "lien arising solely by force of a statute on 
specified circumstances or 
conditions . . . but does not include security interest or judicial lien."  
11 U.S.C.  101(53) 
(emphases added).  Because plaintiffs' tax liens arose under state 
statute, and not from a 
consensual or voluntary agreement with the taxpayer defendants, we concur 
in the bankruptcy 
court's ruling that those liens are not "security interests" for purposes 
of  1322(b)(2). 
         The foregoing interpretation of  1322(b)(2) is supported by 
substantial authority 
from other jurisdictions.  See, e.g., In re DeMaggio, 175 B.R. 144, 146-47 
(Bankr. D.N.H. 
1994) (holding that plain language and statutory history of  1322(b)(2) 
establish that 
nonconsensual tax liens do not fall within antimodification provision of 
that statute); In re Sabec, 
137 B.R. 659, 667-68 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1992) (finding antimodification 
provision of  
1322(b)(2) inapplicable because creditor's interest in the principal 
residence of the debtor was a 
"lien," rather than a "security interest," based on the fact that it arose 
nonconsensually under state 
tax act); In re Venable, 48 B.R. 853, 856 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding 
that city's tax lien 
on debtor's principal residence was modifiable despite  1322(b)(2) 
because not consensual, and 
thus, not a "security interest"); In re Mitchell, 39 B.R. 696, 700 (Bankr. 
D. Or. 1984) (finding 
IRS lien on debtor's principal residence modifiable because statutory, not 
created by agreement 
as required by  1322(b)(2)); In re Seel, 22 B.R. 692, 695-96 (Bankr. D. 
Kan. 1982) (holding 
modifiable a mechanic's lien on debtor's principle residence because it 
was a "statutory lien").  
Nevertheless, plaintiffs urge us to hold that statutory tax liens on 
principal residences are not 
modifiable under  1322(b)(2) because Congress has historically made 
explicit reference to tax 
liens in provisions of the Bankruptcy Code intended to affect such liens.  
Plaintiffs further assert 
that the existence of public policy concerns analogous to those invoked by 
Congress in exempting 
liens for unpaid postpetition property taxes from the automatic stay 
indicates that Congress did 
not mean for tax liens to be modifiable under  1322(b)(2).  In light of 
the plain language of  
1322(b)(2), however, we must decline plaintiffs' invitation to speculate 
as to the intent of 
Congress in this context.  "Where the statutory language is clear, our 
"'sole function . . . is to 
enforce it according to its terms.'"  Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464, 471 
(1993) (quoting United 
States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989)).    
          
               (2) 11 U.S.C.  1325(a)(5)(B)(ii)   
         Our conclusion that plaintiffs' claims are modifiable under  
1322(b)(2) does not 
dispose of this appeal.  We must also determine whether the postpetition 
interest rate confirmed 
by the lower courts passes muster under 11 U.S.C.  1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).  In 
a Chapter 13 
bankruptcy, the debtor is given the opportunity to retain property which 
would otherwise be 
subject to foreclosure by secured creditors.  "In exchange for giving the 
debtor a right to continue 
possession of the property,  1325(a)(5)(B) directs two things: (i) the 
secured creditor shall retain 
a continuing lien on the property; and (ii) the secured creditor shall 
receive from the debtor 'the 
value, as of the effective date of the plan, of such property to be 
distributed under the plan on 
account of such claim [which shall be] not less than the allowed amount of 
such claim.'"  GMAC 
v. Jones, 999 F.2d 63, 66 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting 11 U.S.C.  
1325(a)(5)(B)(ii)).  The latter 
provision requires that the payments to the secured creditor have a 
"present value" equal to the 
creditor's allowed secured claim.  5 Collier on Bankruptcy  
1325.06[4][b][iii][B] (15th ed. 
1982).  Present value is a market rate concept, determined by the use of 
an interest rate which 
fairly compensates the creditor for not receiving the full amount of its 
secured claim upon 
confirmation of the debtor's plan.  There is wide disagreement, however, 
as to what constitutes 
an appropriate rate of interest in this context.  See In re Mitchell, 39 
B.R. at 700.  Although this 
court has posited a framework for determining an appropriate interest rate 
under  
1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) in the context of commercial creditors, neither this 
court nor the Supreme Court 
has addressed that issue in the context of nonconsensual tax lien 
creditors such as plaintiffs.  
          
         In the case at bar, the bankruptcy court began its  1325(a) 
analysis with the 
statutory interest rates, but dismissed them as being in the nature of a 
penalty.  According to the 
court, the statutory rates were raised by the Pennsylvania Legislature 
from six percent to their 
present levels in response to the extremely high commercial interest rates 
of the late 1970's and 
early 1980's.  In the court's view, the state's purpose in raising the 
statutory rates was to "coerce 
and encourage prompt payment of taxes in competition with other higher 
commercial rates."   
         Having rejected the statutory rates, the bankruptcy court 
attempted to determine 
a more reasonable interest rate, ultimately concluding that the 
appropriate rate under  
1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) was "the reasonable cost of interest to the 
[plaintiffs], as of the effective date of 
the plan, over a 60 month period."  Consulting published historical 
interest rates for municipal 
bonds, the court determined that, at a minimum, postpetition interest 
should accrue at 4.05 percent 
for Allegheny County and 4.30 percent for Penn Hills.  Since defendants' 
plans proposed to pay 
postpetition interest at seven percent per annum, they were confirmed. 
         Plaintiffs contend that the bankruptcy court's rejection of the 
statutory rates was 
erroneous.  In support of their position, plaintiffs rely principally upon 
our previously cited 
decision in Jones, wherein we addressed the issue of interest rates under 
 1325(a) in the context 
of a commercial creditor.  In Jones, General Motors Acceptance Corporation 
("GMAC") filed 
secured claims against a number of Chapter 13 debtors who, prior to taking 
bankruptcy, had 
purchased GMC trucks and defaulted on their financing obligations.  Jones, 
999 F.2d at 65.  
GMAC subsequently objected to the debtors' bankruptcy plans on grounds 
that the proposed 
interest rates were too low to provide it with the present value of its 
claims under  
1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).  Id. at 66.   
         Reversing the bankruptcy and district courts, this court held 
that the interest rate 
should be determined with reference to the purpose behind  
1325(a)(5)(B)(ii): "to put the secured 
creditor in an economic position equivalent to the one it would have 
occupied had it received the 
allowed secured amount immediately, thus terminating the relationship 
between the creditor and 
the debtor."  Id. at 66-67.  The Jones court then rejected the bankruptcy 
court's "cost of funds" 
approach, which looks to the rate at which the creditor can borrow funds, 
as falling short of this 
statutory objective by failing to account for: (1) the cost to the 
creditor of sustaining its lending 
relationship with the debtor past the point contemplated in the original 
agreement; and (2) the 
expectation of commercial creditors to make a profit when extending 
credit.  Id. at 67, 69.        
   
         Ultimately, the Jones court concluded that a "coerced loan" 
theory should provide 
the starting point for determining interest rates under  
1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).  Id. at 67.  Thus, the 
court held that the appropriate rate of interest is "that which the 
secured creditor would charge, 
at the effective date of the plan, for a loan similar in character, amount 
and duration to the credit 
which the creditor will be required to extend under the plan."  Id. at 65 
(footnote added).  
According to the court, this approach, unlike the cost of funds method, 
closely approximates the 
creditor's immediate liquidation position because it recognizes that 
creditors incur costs associated 
with the coerced extension of credit and because it incorporates a 
consideration of profit into the 
determination of the  1325(a) interest rate.  Id. at 67-69.  The court 
further found the coerced 
loan approach appealing because it would reduce the litigation and 
transaction costs of Chapter 
13 cases due to the fact that "regularly maintained documents of the 
creditor should make it 
possible for the debtor and creditor to stipulate on the interest rate the 
creditor would charge for 
a new loan of similar character, amount and duration."  Id. at 70. 
         Plaintiffs in the case at bar make two arguments based on Jones.  
First, they 
contend that the plain language of that decision requires that interest in 
the present case be set to 
accrue at the rates that they charge nonbankrupt, delinquent taxpayers 
(i.e., the statutory rates).  
Second, plaintiffs assert that the bankruptcy court erred in applying a 
cost of funds approach 
because that approach was specifically rejected in Jones.  We agree with 
plaintiffs that the 
bankruptcy court's analysis was flawed. 
         In our view, the district court plainly erred by looking solely 
to plaintiffs' cost of 
funds in assessing the appropriateness of the proposed postpetition 
interest rates in this case.  As 
the Ninth Circuit has noted, such an approach forces a governmental 
creditor to 
 
              incur an unconditional obligation to repay the money 
              it was required to borrow . . . in exchange [for] only 
              an inherently risky promise by the debtor to repay 
              the same amount over the applicable time period at 
              essentially the same rate paid by the government on 
              its obligation. 
 
In re Camino Real Landscape Maint. Contractors, Inc., 818 F.2d 1503, 1506 
(9th Cir. 1987) 
(citation omitted).  Thus, the governmental creditor is "worse off as a 
result of the exchange."  
Id.  Moreover, "there is no indication that Congress meant to subsidize 
debtors by making 
available to them the government's own favorable rate of interest."  Id.  
Thus, we hold that for 
plaintiffs to be properly compensated, consistent with Jones, postpetition 
interest rates must be 
set in accordance with the municipalities' costs of maintaining their 
creditor relationship.   
         Since municipalities are not for-profit lending institutions and 
do not regularly 
extend loans that can be used to determine the appropriate rate of 
interest, the case at bar is not 
on all-fours with Jones.  Nevertheless, we do not believe that Jones is 
totally inapplicable in this 
situation, despite GMAC's status as a for-profit entity, or that the "cost 
of funds" approach would 
be proper if applied to the debtor instead of the creditor.  Therefore, 
the principles of Jones must 
be given effect, even if it is not factually identical. 
         We believe that the closest analog to the market loan in Jones is 
the statutory 
interest rate here.  While the analogy is not perfect, it is sufficient:  
an entity forced to delay 
payment that it is entitled to receive is, in effect, extending a loan.  
And the rate that the 
municipality charges for those that coerce loans by not paying their 
property tax bills is twelve 
percent.  In fact, as the difficulties in arriving at another rate have 
shown, the statutory rate is 
really the only practical and reasonable rate to apply.  The statutory 
rate also serves the 
administrative efficiency goal of establishing a readily ascertainable 
"market" rate that will not 
require the time and expense of case-by-case litigation and potentially 
inconsistent results. 
         Political and financial market forces will generally operate to 
keep the statutory rate 
reasonable.  The rate is set by elected officials accountable to citizens 
who, after all, must balance 
their desire to make their neighbors pay their property taxes with the 
consideration that they 
themselves may be in default some day.  In addition, the financial market 
might provide the best 
check against oppressive rates.  If a debtor can, in fact, do better than 
the statutory rate, he or she 
will rationally do what consumers normally do when rates (for instance, 
mortgage notes) become 
higher than the market.  The debtor will "refinance" by obtaining the new 
loan at the lower 
available rate, using the funds to pay off the old loan.  Indeed, the 
statutory rate at issue in this 
case--twelve percent--is not unreasonable.  Credit card companies 
regularly charge their 
customers, who are not even high credit risks, interest at rates as high 
as eighteen percent.  The 
debtors in this case, of course, are in bankruptcy and, although the 
municipality currently holds 
liens that are oversecured, property values can decline. 
         In support of our holding, we note that numerous courts have held 
that 
nonconsensual oversecured creditors are entitled to receive the rates of 
interest dictated by the 
statutes under which their liens arose, unless those rates constitute a 
penalty.  See, e.g., Galveston 
Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Heartland Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 159 B.R. 198, 204 
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 
1993); see also In re Parr Meadows Racing Ass'n, 880 F.2d 1540, 1549 (2d 
Cir. 1989), cert. 
denied sub nom., Suffolk County Treasurer v. Barr, 493 U.S. 1058 (1990).  
Although the 
bankruptcy court initially determined that the statutory rates at issue in 
this appeal are in the 
nature of a penalty, we find this decision to be in error.  See Meilink v. 
Unemployment Reserves 
Commission, 314 U.S. 564 (1942).  In Meilink, a unanimous Supreme Court 
held that a 
statutorily imposed interest rate of twelve percent on debts owed to a 
state's unemployment fund 
did not constitute a penalty within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code.  
In that regard, the Court 
stated:      
                   It is common knowledge that interest rates vary 
              not only according to the general use value of money 
              but also according to the hazard of particular classes 
              of loans.  Delinquent taxpayers as a class are a poor 
              credit risk; tax default, unless an incident of 
              legitimate tax litigation, is, to the eye sensitive to 
              credit indications, a signal of distress.  A rate of 
              interest on tax delinquencies which is low in 
              comparison to the taxpayer's borrowing rate--if he 
              can borrow at all--is a temptation to use the state as 
              a convenient, if involuntary, banker by the simple 
              practice of deferring the payment of taxes. 
 
                   Another variable is the amount necessary to 
              compensate for the trouble of handling the item.  
              The legislature may include compensation to the 
              state for the increased costs of administration in the 
              exaction for delay in paying taxes without thereby 
              changing it from interest to penalty. 
 
Id. at 567.   
         We believe that Judge Sarokin's arguments for using the prime 
rate prove too 
much.  If the prime rate represents the appropriate rate in the commercial 
marketplace, why did 
not the Jones court use the prime rate in that case, which, after all, 
involved a commercial lender? 
         Moreover, that the Pennsylvania legislature has not seen fit to 
change the statutory 
rate on delinquent tax loans for some years, in our view, does not render 
the twelve percent rate 
penal or unreasonable.  If the statutory rate, as suggested by the 
dissent, "far exceed[s] what the 
Plaintiffs could obtain under current market conditions," then the debtors 
(or the bankruptcy 
trustee) can proceed to obtain the more favorable rate in the market. 
 
                          VI. CONCLUSION 
         Based on the foregoing, we AFFIRM the district court's award of 
prepetition 
interest to Penn Hills and Allegheny County at the statutory rates of ten 
and twelve percent per 
annum, respectively.  We REVERSE, however, the decisions of the bankruptcy 
court and district 
court on the issue of postpetition interest rates and hold that Penn Hills 
and Allegheny County are 
also entitled to postpetition interest at the respective statutory rates. 
Rankin v. DeSarno, Nos. 95-3007/3011/3037 
_________________________________________________________________ 
SAROKIN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part: 
         I join Parts I, II, III, IV, V.A, and V.B.(1) of the Majority's 
opinion.  However, 
because I do not believe that the statutory rate should apply to 
postpetition interest, I dissent from 
the Majority's analysis and conclusion in Part V.B.(2). 
         I agree with the Majority that the "cost of funds" approach 
adopted by the 
bankruptcy court is flawed because it under-compensates the municipality 
and it offers the debtors 
a windfall by enabling them, in effect, to borrow funds from the 
municipality at rates that are 
generally available only to state entities.   
         But because I do not agree with the Majority's reliance on 
General Motors 
Acceptance Corp. v. Jones, 999 F.2d 63, 67 (3d Cir. 1993), I would reject 
as well the Plaintiffs' 
suggestion that we apply the statutory rate to post-petition interest 
payments. 
         The situation here differs from that in Jones in one important 
way: in Jones, the 
creditor was a commercial lender, in the business of lending money to earn 
a profit.  Unlike the 
Majority, see Majority Op., typescript at 12, I believe that this 
difference is significant. 
                      I. The statutory rate 
         In a market that is subject to the rigors and constraints of 
competition, the interest 
rate charged by a commercial lender (Lender A)  should reflect the 
approximate cost of capital 
plus transaction costs, and a small profit component.  If interest is set 
at a rate that substantially 
exceeds Lender A's costs in order to yield greater profits, competitors 
should be able to lure 
borrowers away from Lender A by setting their rates below that charged by 
Lender A while still 
earning a profit.  Ultimately, the more competitive the market, the more 
closely the rate will 
reflect the costs incurred by the lender.  Therefore, setting post-
petition interest at a rate equal to 
the rate charged by a creditor-lender in the commercial market should come 
closest to 
compensating that creditor both for the non-availability of its capital 
and for the costs of 
maintaining the relationship, and should therefore "put the secured 
creditor in an economic 
position equivalent to the one it would have occupied had it received the 
allowed secured amount 
immediately, thus terminating the relationship between the creditor and 
the donor."  Jones, 999 
F.2d at 66-67. 
         Here, the creditors are governmental entities.  The interest 
rates that they can 
charge "debtors" -- i.e., those who have defaulted on their tax payments -
- are not constrained by 
competitive considerations, but imposed by statute.  These rates were set 
at their current level in 
the early 1980s, and have not been modified since.  "Courts are generally 
in agreement that an 
interest rate to compute present value must be responsive to current 
economic conditions" and 
"that an unchanging fixed rate established at some prior time is not 
appropriate in a present value 
analysis."  In re DeMaggio, 175 B.R. 144, 150-51 (Bankr. N.H. 1994).  It 
is easy to understand 
why: market rates have dropped significantly since the early 1980s.  The 
statutory rates have not 
followed the commercial market's downward path and as a result "ha[ve] no 
relation to current 
economic conditions."  Id. at 151.  In fact, they far exceed what the 
Plaintiffs could obtain under 
current market conditions.  Because they are so high, the statutory rates 
now "include a punitive 
element that is contrary to the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code" and 
"inimical to financial 
rehabilitation of the debtor."  In re Camino Real Landscape Maintenance 
Contractors, Inc., 818 
F.2d 1503, 1507 n.2 (9th Cir. 1987).  See also In re DeMaggio, 175 B.R. at 
151 (noting that 
"[i]nterest rates on delinquent taxes frequently incorporate a punitive 
aspect to discourage 
nonpayment."). 
         Because statutory rates are not subject to the discipline of the 
market, and because 
considerations of deterrence may in fact warrant a rate of interest for 
tax evasion that far exceeds 
costs, there is no reason to expect that the statutory rates are 
calculated to compensate the 
Plaintiffs for the present value of their claims, and to serve the 
objective of section 
1325(a)(5)(B)(ii), which is "to put the creditor in the same position it 
would have been in if it had 
been allowed to end the lending relationship at the point of the 
bankruptcy filing by repossessing 
the collateral."  Jones, 999 F.2d at 69.      Therefore, I reject the 
approach recommended by 
the Plaintiffs and espoused by the Majority, and would not set the 
postpetition interest rate at the 
statutory rate. 
                        II. The prime rate 
         I would hold, instead, that the appropriate rate to compute the 
present value of a 
claim by an oversecured government creditor pursuant to section 
1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) is the rate 
charged by commercial banks to prime commercial loan customers -- that is, 
the prime rate -- for 
a loan of equivalent amount and duration.  This method has been adopted by 
other courts, see, 
e.g., In re Jordan, 130 B.R. 185, 191 (D.N.J. 1991); In re Hudock, 124 
B.R. 532, 534 (N.D. 
Ill. 1991), and it addresses most of the concerns raised by alternative 
methods. 
         First, because it imposes a rate higher than the municipal bond 
rate, it offers the 
Plaintiffs a measure of compensation for the various costs, beyond the 
costs of capital, incurred 
in the delayed collection of tax payments. 
         Second, because it is based on a market rate, it is sensitive to 
changes in the costs 
of borrowing in the larger economy, and derivatively to the costs of 
borrowing for municipal 
governments as well.  "Market rates are the best indicators of the present 
value of deferred 
payments because they are products of supply and demand, reflecting the 
interactions of economic 
variables that affect the cost of lending money."  In re Ivey, 131 B.R. 
43, 49 (Bankr. N.C. 1991). 
         Third, because it is divorced from the statutory rate, it does 
not include a punitive 
element that is inimical to the purposes of bankruptcy reorganization. 
         Fourth, it is a readily available figure, and therefore 
relatively easy to compute. 
         Fifth, it does not create any incentives for debtors to delay 
payment of their real 
property taxes, since they would incur little benefit from such a delay. 
         I note that the Plaintiffs had urged that we consider a variation 
of this approach if 
we rejected the statutory rate.  Specifically, they had urged that we 
adopt the prevailing 
commercial market rate, but taking into account factors such as the term 
of the payout period, the 
value of security and the risk of default, the statutory rate of interest, 
and the characteristics of 
the debtor in each case.  Clm. Brf. at 34.  Several circuits have adopted 
this measure of present 
value for debt owed to government, albeit in the context of a Chapter 11 
bankruptcy.  See, e.g., 
In re Camino Real Landscape Maintenance Contractors, Inc., 818 F.2d at 
1504 (holding that "the 
debtor must pay the government interest at the rate the debtor would pay a 
commercial lender for 
a loan of equivalent amount and duration, considering the risk of default 
and any security); United 
States v. Neal Pharmacal Co., 789 F.2d 1283, 1289 (8th Cir. 1986); In re 
Southern States Motor 
Inns, Inc., 709 F.2d 647, 652-53 (11th Cir. 1983) (same).  Under this more 
refined approach, 
"the bankruptcy court must make a case-by-case determination of what 
interest the reorganizing 
debtor would have to pay a creditor in order to obtain a loan on 
equivalent terms in the open 
market."  In re Camino Real Landscape Maintenance Contractors, Inc., 818 
F.2d at 1508.   
         The approach urged upon us by the Plaintiffs is unnecessarily 
unwieldy, and 
therefore I would reject it.  All three cases cited by the Plaintiffs 
dealt with the proper method for 
determining the rate of interest to be applied in calculating deferred 
payments of delinquent federal 
taxes pursuant to 11 U.S.C.  1129(a)(9)(C).  However, section 
1129(a)(9)(C) applies only to 
unsecured claims.  Therefore, the risk of default on such debt is 
substantial.  The risk present in 
the instant case is much less significant.  As the DeSarnos note, the 
County and School District 
"are at very low risk of not receiving payment while enjoying a 
correspondingly high quality of 
security in the event of default under the Plan.  The taxing bodies both 
enjoy priority status as 
creditors of the Debtors and are first in line to receive the amounts owed 
due to their position of 
possessing a statutory lien upon the Debtors' residence."  DeSarno Brief 
at 24.  Therefore, it is 
not necessary to refine our approach to account for the particular 
characteristics of each debtor. 
         I recognize that the prime rate approach, which reflects 
transactions between 
commercial lenders and borrowers, is not a perfect fit for government 
creditors.  As noted supra, 
the costs of borrowing for a municipal government and for a commercial 
lender are not identical, 
both with regard to their "replacement costs" -- i.e., the rate at which 
they can borrow funds -- 
and "transaction costs."  In addition, the market rate reflects the profit 
margin that motivates 
commercial lenders in the first place, but that is not a consideration for 
municipalities.   
         While the commercial market rate of interest for a low-risk, 
secured loan is not a 
perfectly accurate measure, exactitude is not the only consideration -- 
judicial economy and 
efficiency are also important factors, especially in matters involving 
high volume and relatively 
low amounts.  Numerous courts, including this one, have recognized "the 
importance of 
minimizing the expense of getting a chapter 13 plan formulated and 
approved," Jones, 999 F.2d 
at 70, and therefore devising a formula that is relatively easy to 
compute.  I believe that the 
approach I suggest here strikes the best balance between these two 
priorities and satisfactorily 
addresses our various other concerns as well. 
